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Contingency Theory of Strategic
Conﬂict Management: Directions 
for the Practice of Crisis
Communication from a Decade 
of Theory Development, 
Discovery, and Dialogue
Augustine Pang, Yan Jin, and 
Glen T. Cameron
The dilemma facing crisis scholars could not be more paradoxical: How does one
explain and predict the outcome of a phenomenon – characteristics which
Chaffee and Berger (1987) argued to be the foundation of a theory – that is so
contextual-dependent, where the twists and turns of unfolding events often frus-
trate the natural ebb of what one could reasonably surmise as logical trajectory?
Admittedly, the bête noire for many in the ﬁeld is that our powers of deductive
reasoning, often woven from threads of foraged facts surrounding the unpredictability
of crises, are often tragically compromised and encumbered by myriad complex-
ities that one can be forgiven to consider crisis communication, which Fearn-Banks
(2002) deﬁned as “dialogue between the organization and its public prior to, dur-
ing, and after the negative occurrence” (p. 9), being borne out of experience of
dealing with uncertainty than erudition to capture a certain semblance of certainty.
More art than science.
Without doubt, there is a science behind the ﬁnesse of crisis communication.
This science has been gleaned from best practices (Seeger 2006) and the practice
has been recorded in established textbooks (e.g., Coombs 2007; Fearn-Banks 2002;
Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger 2007). While best practices, which Venette (2006)
described as “strategies” that “appear” as “common-sense recommendations” 
(p. 230), are useful knowledge, these hold little weight if not subjected to the
rigor of scholarship (Coombs 2008). More signiﬁcantly, Heath (2006) argued that
practice should be enhanced, entrenched, and enabled through research.
While research in crisis communication has been argued to be “most addressed”
(Pauchant & Douville 1993: 56), Falkheimer and Heide (2006) argued that 
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the ﬁeld is “dominated by non-theoretical case studies and guidelines” (p. 181).
Regrettably, theory building and development have been painfully gradual
(Fishman 1999; Frandsen & Johansen 2005). Yet, as communication scientists,
it is our cardinal duty to continually reﬁne a structure to help us order, explain,
predict, and control the world around us, argued Chaffee and Berger (1987).
“Communication scientists think and talk about theory a lot. They work toward
development of the theory, and they bemoan the fact that there is not more good
theory in the ﬁeld” (p. 100).
Developing A New Theoretical Perspective
In crisis communication, much of the scholarship has been framed from public
relations research and practice (Falkheimer & Heide 2006). Increasingly, it is
regarded as a critical component of public relations (Coombs 2001; Grunig, Grunig,
& Dozier 2002; Reber, Cropp, & Cameron 2003). Thus, given that much of the
literature on effective public relations had been built on Grunig and Grunig’s (1992)
and Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) excellence theory, it is never easy to question the
canon of the ﬁeld by developing an alternative perspective in public relations that
has since evolved into a viable theoretical lens to examine conﬂict management
which in turn informs crisis communication. The excellence theory has been argued
to be normative theory (Grunig & Grunig 1992) by its much-esteemed founders
and has so dominated research (Botan & Taylor 2004) that when DeFleur (1998)
decried the lack of paradigmatic theoretical advances in communication, he 
certainly failed to address the resistance one faces in querying existing premises
to make that quantum leap of a paradigmatic shift in thinking.
The contingency theory of strategic conﬂict management, which began ques-
tioning excellence theory’s positioning of symmetrical communication as norma-
tive theory on how organizations should be practicing public relations that was
regarded as the most ethical and effective (Grunig 1996), might have had its 
humble beginnings as an elaboration, qualiﬁcation, and extension of the value of
symmetry (Cameron 1997; Cameron et al. 2001). Over the last decade, however,
it has come into its own, and emerged as an empirically tested perspective that
argued that the complexity in strategic communication could not be reduced to
excellence theory’s models of excellence. Communication, argued its contingency
theorists, could be examined through a continuum whereby organizations take a
particular stance at a given time for a given public depending on the circumstance,
instead of subscribing the practice to one model or a hybrid of two models in
excellence theory. In offering a new perspective, it was by no means an attempt
of contingency theorists to set up excellence theory for a “straw man argument”
(Yarbrough et al. 1998: 53). Instead, its proponents argued that it was a “sense-
making effort to ground a theory of accommodation in practitioner experience,
to challenge certain aspects of the excellence theory” (p. 53). But without the
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revolutionary ideas of excellence to shape a strategic, managerial vision for pub-
lic relations and more importantly, the vision of the practitioner as far more than
a hired advocate, contingency theory would not have arisen.
Against the excellence backdrop then, contingency research was, by all intents
and purposes, an attempt to provide as realistic and grounded a description of
how intuitive, nuanced, and textured public relations has been practiced (Cancel
et al. 1999; Cameron, Pang, & Jin 2007). This paradigmatic reconﬁguration might
have rufﬂed more feathers than it was initially appreciated (Cameron 1997); nonethe-
less, it was a necessity borne out of a need to demonstrate the subtleties of com-
munication management that a single model like the two-way symmetry, though
argued to be “real” (Grunig & Grunig 1992: 320), was “too inﬂexible to be 
meaningful” (Yarbrough et al. 1998: 53).
For a paradigmatic theoretical shift to emerge, Kuhn (1996) suggested it must
satisfy three conditions. First, it builds upon “pre-established theory” (p. 16). Second,
it receives the “assent of the relevant community” (p. 94) whose “knowledge of
[the] shared paradigm can be assumed” (p. 20), and this same community agrees
to commit to the “same rules and standards for scientiﬁc practice” (p. 11). Third,
it represents a “sign of maturity” in the development pattern of the ﬁeld (p. 11).
For the emerging paradigmatic thinking to take root and be accepted, Kuhn (1996)
argued that the theory “must seem better than its competitors, but it need not,
and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted” 
(pp. 17–18). By all measures, the contingency theory has satisﬁed most, if not all
of Kuhn’s criteria. Its genesis was in the established work of the excellence and
grounded theory; and it has been systematically subjected to the same scientiﬁc
rigor as any empirical research.
Theory to Inform Crisis Communication Practice
While the jury is out whether the contingency theory would be considered a paradig-
matic breakthrough in due time, for now, with its decade of theory development,
discovery, and dialogue, it can offer insights and directions on how crisis com-
munication can be undertaken. It has been applied in diverse organizational, national,
and international settings, on a wide range of interdisciplinary issues, like health
crises, political crises, public diplomacy, crisis communications, and mergers and
acquisitions. The contingency theory, which counts among its inﬂuence public
relations literature, excellence theory, observations, and grounded theory, and
employing multiple methodological tools, addresses the concerns raised by
Falkheimer and Heide (2006), who argued that this “underdeveloped research
ﬁeld” ought to be “dominated by intercultural theory, quantitative empirical sur-
veys, analyzed through established national frames and discourses” (p. 181).
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, to reassess and recapitulate 
the theory’s explanatory powers in portraying a realistic understanding of how
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communication is managed between the organization and its diverse publics, with
the aim of distilling insights on how organizations and practitioners can review and
reassess their own practice of crisis communication. Second, the theory’s initial
postulations of 87 factors inﬂuencing stance movements may have been more com-
plex than imagined. This chapter aims to streamline and redeﬁne the inﬂuence 
of factors into a more parsimonious form by examining which are the more 
pertinent factors and how they are relevant to crisis communication. This will be
instructive to organizations and practitioners as they now have empirically tested
straws to grasp in understanding the key dynamics that are at play during crises.
Third, through the aforementioned aims, to contemplate new directions on how
crisis communication can be undertaken. While organizations cannot control the
occurrence and unpredictability of crises, they can determine how to respond to
them (Coombs 2001) and control, to a large extent, how communication ought
to be conducted. Establishing control is the basic responsibility of organizations
and practitioners during crises (Coombs 2007).
This chapter, a meta-theoretical analysis based on an extensive review of litera-
ture of studies employing contingency theory, integrated with an interdisciplinary
tapestry of conﬂict, management, and public relations literature, is divided into
three sections. The ﬁrst chronicles its origins, its theoretical platform, and the nascent
testing and expounding of the theory. The second consolidates the theoretical
development. The third encapsulates the lessons learnt and offers insights to 
crisis communication practice.
To constantly draw relevance on how the theory can inform the practice of 
crisis communication, some measure of literary license and indulgence is sought.
The chapter is structured thus: at the beginning of each section, a crisis axiom,
extracted from the best practices in crisis communication in the Journal of
Applied Communication Research’s special issue on crisis communication in 2006,
is featured. This is followed by a statement of crisis challenge that reﬂects the strug-
gles that practitioners may have faced. The challenge is met by description and
enumeration of the contingency theory and the developments made. Practical insights
on how the discoveries made in the theory can inform the practice of crisis com-
munication will be highlighted to sum up each section, followed by takeaway points
in the form of Crisis Lesson Points.
Redeﬁning Communication During Crises: 
The Beginnings of Contingency Theory (1997–2001)
Crises are “dynamic”
(Seeger 2006: 241)
Crisis Challenge: Why do organizations and practitioners sometimes get 
locked into thinking that there is only a set way(s) of communicating during
crises?
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Much of crisis research has been drawn from excellence theory’s four models of
excellence. They are:
Press agentry/publicity model: Here, the organization is only interested in making
its ethos and products known, even at the expense of half-truths.
Public information model: Predominantly characterized by one-way transfer of 
information from the organization to the publics, the aim is to provide infor-
mation in a journalistic form.
Two-way asymmetric model: Instead of a rigid transference of information, the 
organization uses surveys and polls to persuade the publics to accept its point
of view.
Two-way symmetric model: Here, the organization is more amenable to develop-
ing a dialogue with the publics. Communication ﬂows both ways between the
organization and the public and both sides are prepared to change their stances,
with the aims of resolving the crisis in a professional, ethical, and effective way.
The two-way symmetrical model has been positioned as normative theory, which
stated how organizations should be practicing public relations that was regarded
as the most ethical and effective manner (Grunig & Grunig 1992; Grunig 1996).
The contingency theory, however, saw a different reality. Cancel et al. (1997)
argued there were several reasons why the four models of public relations were
inadequate to explain the range of operational stances and strategies that could
take place in public relations. Central to their arguments were three key reasons.
First, the data collected had proved the theory to be “weak” (p. 37). Studies 
conducted to test the models’ reliability had shown to be “below minimum 
standards of reliability” (p. 37). Second, the authors argued that the assumption
of the two-way symmetrical model representing excellence in public relations was
methodically ﬂawed because research did not support it. Citing Hellweg’s (1989)
ﬁndings, the authors noted that evidence to demonstrate “symmetrical techniques
produce asymmetrical results” was lacking (p. 39).
Third, inherent in the assumption of the two-way symmetrical model was 
that the organization must engage in dialogue with the public, even though the
public may be morally repugnant. This included “offering trade-offs” to a morally
repugnant public, an exercise that could be viewed as “unethical” (p. 38).
Public relations research also questioned the possibility and ethics of dialogue.
There had been instances when the organization would not enter into any form of
dialogue with the publics because they were unduly unreasonable, and unwilling to
collaborate. Kelleher (2003) found that public relations could be proscribed by
circumstances, such as collective bargaining. There were also limits to collabora-
tion, argued Leichty (1997), particularly as collaboration required “two or more
parties to cooperate in good faith: Collaboration is a ‘relational strategy’ and cannot
be enacted without cooperation” (p. 55). In a recent critical analysis of symmetrical
communication, Roper (2005) questioned the motive of open, collaborative
negotiation and communication, and in whose interests concessions were made:
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In assessing whether an organization is exercising “excellent” public relations
through a symmetrical approach to communication we also need to examine the extent
of the concessions made to external stakeholders. Are they “just enough” to quiet
public criticism, allowing essentially a business as usual strategy to remain in force?
Are they allowing the continuing cooperation between business and government,
preventing the introduction of unwelcome legislation – and at what price? (p. 83)
Stoker and Tusinski (2006) also thought that although the goals of symmetrical
communication were commendable, they were unreasonable, in that symmetry may
pose moral problems in public relations, and may lead to “ethically questionable
quid pro quo relationships” (p. 174). Holtzhausen, Petersen, and Tindall (2003)
rejected the notion of symmetry as the normative public relations approach. 
In their study of South African practitioners, the authors found that practitioners
developed their practice that reﬂected a greater concern about the relationship
between the organization and its publics based upon the larger economic, social,
and political realities.
From communicating in models to adopting 
stances along a continuum
The move from the four models to a continuum began when Cameron and his
colleagues found studies indicating that “unobtrusive control” (Cameron 1997:
33) might exist in the symmetrical and asymmetrical models. Hellweg (1989) had
argued that symmetrical communication should be reﬁned “along less rigorous
lines of a continuum ranging from conﬂict to cooperation” (Cancel et al. 1997:
33). Utilizing the ﬁndings of Hellweg (1989), Murphy (1991), Dozier, Grunig,
and Grunig (1995), and Cancel et al. (1997), they argued that public relations
was more accurately portrayed along a continuum. “This view is a more effective
and realistic illustration of public relations and organization behavior than a 
conceptualization of four models” (Cancel et al. 1997: 34), the authors argued.
Moreover, because of the ﬂuidity of the circumstances, which, in turn, may affect
an organization’s stance and strategies, a continuum would be far more grounded
to reality that was able to “more accurately portray the variety of public relations
stances available” (p. 34).
The continuum, argued Cancel et al. (1999), thus explained “an organization’s
possible wide range of stances taken toward an individual public, differing from
the more proscriptive and mutually exclusive categorization” (p. 172) found in
the four models.
Cameron and his colleagues took the idea of continua further, arguing for 
a more realistic description of how public relations was practiced. It examined
how organizations practiced a variety of public relations stances at one point 
in time, how those stances changed, sometimes almost instantaneously, and 
what inﬂuenced the change in stance (Cancel et al. 1997). Their reasoning was 
this: because public relations, and especially conﬂict management and crisis 
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communication, was so complex and subtle, understanding it from any of the four
models, particularly the two-way symmetrical model, would be far too limiting
and rigid. “Effective and ethical public relations is possible at a range of points
on a continuum of accommodation,” argued Yarbrough et al. (1998: 53).
Excellent public relations activity, including dealing with conﬂicts and crises, 
“cannot and should not be typiﬁed as a single model or even a hybrid model of
practice” (Cameron et al. 2001: 245).
The organizational response to the public relations dilemma at hand, accord-
ing to the contingency theory, which has, at one end of the continuum, advo-
cacy, and at the other end, accommodation, was, thus, “It Depends.” The theory
offered a matrix of 87 factors (see appendix 1), arranged thematically, that the
organization could draw on to determine its stance. Between advocacy, which means
arguing for one’s own case, and accommodation, which means giving in, was a
wide range of operational stances that inﬂuenced public relations strategies and
these entailed “different degrees of advocacy and accommodation” (Cancel et al.
1997: 37). Along this continuum, the theory argued that any of the 87 factors
could affect the location of an organization on that continuum “at a given time
regarding a given public” (Cancel et al. 1999: 172; Yarbrough et al. 1998: 40).
Pure –––––––––––––––––––––––––– Pure
Advocacy Accommodation
The theory sought to understand the dynamics, within and outside the 
organization, that could affect an organization’s stance. By understanding these
dynamics, it elaborated, speciﬁed the conditions, factors, and forces that under-
girded such a stance, so that public relations need not be viewed by artiﬁcially
classifying into boxes of behavior. It aimed to “offer a structure for better 
understanding the dynamics of accommodation as well as the efﬁcacy and ethical
implications of accommodation in public relations practice” (Yarbrough et al. 
1998: 41).
Insight 1: If crises are, indeed, dynamic (Seeger 2006: 241), communicating
during crises should be equally, if not more, dynamic. Instead of viewing
communication during crises as the practice of models, with the two-way
symmetrical model held as the ideal model, organizations can consider
adopting stances, or positions, ranging from advocating its case to accom-
modating the case to its publics.
Crisis Lesson Point: By changing the view that crisis communication can be prac-
ticed as the dynamic enactment of stances along a continuum, organizations
and practitioners are better placed and in greater control to determine how
they can manage the crisis campaign most effectively because this will free
them from being locked into a certain mode (read: boxes) of thinking. It
liberates them to think out-of-the-box, and provides more leverage in crisis
planning and campaign implementation.
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Testing and Expounding the Contingency Theory
(1998–2001)
Crisis communication is “most effective when it is part of the decision process
itself.”
(Seeger 2006: 236)
Crisis Challenge: How can organizations and practitioners be empowered to
understand that they can rely on a framework to help them understand how
their decisions impact their actions?
To test the theoretical veracity and the applicability of the theory, Cancel et al.
(1999) took it to the practitioners. In wide-ranging and extensive interviews with
public relations professionals, the authors sought to understand how the practi-
tioners managed conﬂict and whether the theory made sense to them. “In effect,
we set out to see whether ‘there is anything to the contingency theory’ and if so, to
see how the theory can be grounded in the words, experience, and perspective
of practitioners” (p. 172), the authors stated. This was done through the use of
a few broad questions about when and how practitioners “reach out” to key publics.
This study broke new ground. Besides the study participants’ unknowing con-
currence with the nascent contingency theory’s assertion that a continuum of advo-
cacy and accommodation was a “valid representation of their interactions and their
corporations’ interactions with external publics” (p. 176), further insights were
shed on the relative inﬂuences of the 87 factors in positing the organization’s 
position on the continuum, spawning the contingency terms, predisposing and
situational variables.
While practitioners’ unsolicited views meshed with a dynamic and modulating
representation of what happens in public relations, they argued that some of 
the 87 variables featured more prominently than others. There were factors that
inﬂuenced the organization’s position on the continuum before it interacts with
a public; and there were variables that inﬂuenced the organization’s position on
the continuum during interaction with its publics. The former have been cat-
egorized as predisposing variables, while the latter, situational variables. Some of
the well-supported predisposing factors Cancel et al. (1999) found included 
(1) the size of the organization; (2) corporate culture; (3) business exposure; 
(4) public relations to dominant coalition; (5) dominant coalition enlightenment;
and (6) individual characteristics of key individuals, like the CEO. These factors
were supported in the crisis management literature. For instance, organizational
culture had been found to be a key factor in ensuring the formulation of a sound
crisis plan and excellent crisis management (Marra 1998). Bechler (1995) also found
that organizational culture dictated how the organization responded to crisis.
Situational variables were factors that were most likely to inﬂuence how an organ-
ization related to a public by effecting shifts from a predisposed accommodative
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or adversarial stance along the continuum during an interaction. Some of the sup-
ported situational factors included (1) urgency of the situation; (2) characteristics
of the other public; (3) potential or obvious threats; and (4) potential costs or
beneﬁt for the organization from choosing the various stances (Cancel et al. 1999).
The classiﬁcation of the factors into two categories was by no means an attempt
to order the importance of one over the other in a given situation. The 
situational variables could determine the eventual degree of accommodation an
organization takes by “effecting shifts from a predisposed accommodative or 
adversarial stance along the continuum during an interaction with the external
public” (Yarbrough et al. 1998: 43). At the same time, an organization may not
move from its predisposed stance if the situational variables are not compelling
nor powerful enough to inﬂuence the position or if the opportunity costs of the
situational variables do not lead to any visible beneﬁts (Cameron et al. 2001).
Consequently, both predisposing and situational factors could move the organ-
ization toward increased accommodation or advocacy. What was important in 
determining where the organization situates on the continuum involved the
“weighing of many factors found in the theory” (Yarbrough et al. 1998: 50).
Notably, the factors explain movement either way along the continuum.
While Cameron and his colleagues had, by this time, managed to explain the
complexity, contextual, and even the conundrum of a dialogic process, they 
had yet to answer one of the central questions they posed in arguing why sym-
metrical communication could not be normative. The question was whether 
communication could still take place with a morally repugnant public. A broader
casting of the question was whether other factors precluded or proscribed com-
munication termed variously as dialogue, trade-offs, accommodation, or symmetrical
communication.
That question took them to a further elaboration and explication of the the-
ory. Cameron et al. (2001) argued that there were occasions when accommoda-
tion was not possible at all, due to moral, legal, and regulatory reasons. They labeled
them as proscriptive variables. Six were identiﬁed: (1) when there was moral 
conviction that an accommodative or dialogic stance towards a public may be 
inherently unethical; (2) when there was a need to maintain moral neutrality in
the face of contending publics; (3) when legal constraints curtailed accommoda-
tion; (4) when there were regulatory restraints; (5) when senior management 
prohibited an accommodative stance; (6) when the issue became a jurisdictional
concern within the organization and resolution of the issue took on a constrained
and complex process of negotiation. The proscriptive variables “did not neces-
sarily drive increased or extreme advocacy, but did preclude compromise or even
communication with a given public,” argued Cameron et al. (2001: 253).
Theoretical discussions aside, to show how contingency theory was a realistic
description of the practitioners’ world and why two-way symmetry was imprac-
tical and inﬂexible, Yarbrough et al. (1998) applied it to how conﬂicts were 
managed by C. Richard Yarbrough, managing director-communications of the 
1996 Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG). Three episodes, one
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involving the moving of preliminary volleyball matches from one venue to
another due to the conﬂict between gay activists and local politicians who had
passed an anti-gay resolution; the second involving a conﬂict between the ACOG
board of directors and the media concerning the disclosure of executive salaries;
and the third involving a conﬂict between the ACOG and a minority minister
over an Olympic sponsor, illustrated how textured the conﬂicts were and how
dynamic changes in stance were effected on the continuum. For the second episode,
for instance, even though the ACOG initially practiced an advocacy stance against
the disclosure of salaries, it ﬁnally relented due to the inﬂuence of situational 
factors, particularly changes mandated by a higher authority, the International
Olympic Council (IOC) that forced its hands to move to the end of the con-
tinuum towards accommodation. The study proved not just the “sophisticated
process” of assessment and management of a given situation, but that effective,
ethical public relations can be practiced “in a full range of places on the con-
tinuum from advocacy to accommodation” (p. 55).
Insight 2: If crisis communication is “most effective when it is part of the deci-
sion process itself ” (Seeger 2006: 236), before organizations or practitioners
adopt a stance or position in communication, they have to work in some key
factors as they consider the decisions. These factors are critical in reﬂecting 
the characteristics, intents, and motivations of the organization (predisposing
factors) as well as the external constraints, demands, and realities of the cri-
sis (situational factors). For example, where communication is not possible
during the crisis, it may mean that the decision, based on overriding con-
cerns of the organization (proscriptive factors), prevents it from doing so.
Crisis Lesson Point: If crisis communication is reconceived as enactment of stances
along a continuum, organizations and practitioners now have a framework
and structure to understand the basis, intents, and motivations of each deci-
sion prior to adoption of each stance. Predisposing factors shed light on the
decisions that need to be considered before organizations and practitioners
enter into crisis communication; situational factors illuminate the decisions
behind each stance movement during crisis communication; proscriptive 
factors set parameters on why crisis communication may sometimes be cur-
tailed. By understanding the dynamic interactions and interrelations of these
factors, organizations and practitioners are able to assess how and why their
decisions have impact on their actions.
Theory Development: Structural Analyses of
Contingency Factors (2001–2006)
An organization . . . experiencing crisis must listen to the concerns of the pub-
lic, take these concerns into account . . . public’s perception is its reality.
(Seeger 2006: 238–9)
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Crisis Challenge: What are the straws that organizations and practitioners can
grasp as they are confronted with the realities of crises?
Over the years, the central tenet of the contingency theory has resolutely
remained, that organizations practice a variety of stances on the continuum, and
the stances taken are inﬂuenced by a welter of factors. Based on the key words,
stance on the continuum and factors, a wealth of research has been carried out,
either to explain and illustrate the theory further, or to expand and extend 
key aspects of the theory, leading to developments of new theoretical frameworks.
Three streams of research are evident: ﬁrst, research has been carried out to elabor-
ate, afﬁrm, explain, or add new factors that further expound on the dynamism 
of movement along the continuum; second, explicating of stance movement 
along the continuum; and third, predicting the enactment of strategies based on
the stance adopted.
Analyses of factors inﬂuencing stance
With over eighty distinct factors identiﬁed in the contingency theory, Cameron
and his colleagues acknowledged that to manage them in “any useful way”
(Cameron et al. 2001: 247), parsimony was needed. While the proscriptive vari-
ables had been found to limit dialogue and accommodation, further delineation
of the relative inﬂuences of factors was needed. Acknowledging that much of 
the claims of the theory had been found based on qualitative research, Reber and
Cameron (2003) set out to test the construct of ﬁve thematic variables through
scale building on 91 top public relations practitioners. The ﬁve thematic variables
were external threats, external public characteristics, organizational characteristics,
public relations department characteristics, and dominant coalition characteristics.
The authors found that the scales supported “the theoretical soundness of con-
tingency and the previous qualitative testing of contingency constructs” (p. 443).
Signiﬁcantly, for each of the thematic variables, they discovered the attitudes of
public relations practitioners towards each of the thematic variables that would
affect the organizations’ willingness to dialogue. Some of the key insights the authors
found relating to the thematic variables included:
External threats: contrary to their earlier study, government regulations would not
impede dialogue with a public because they were “infrequent enough” (p. 443).
However, organizations would not engage in dialogue with a public if that
legitimized its claims by talking to them.
External public characteristics: the size, credibility, commitment, and power of 
the external public were attributes an organization would consider in their 
willingness to engage in dialogue.
Organizational characteristics: the past negative experiences and the presence 
of in-house counsel were likely to affect the organization’s willingness to 
dialogue.
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Public relations department characteristics: public relations practitioners’ member-
ship in the dominant coalition would affect the organization’s willingness to
dialogue.
Dominant coalition characteristics: when public relations practitioners are repre-
sented in the dominant coalition, organizations are likely to practice symmetrical
communication.
The need for public relations practitioners to be represented in the dominant coali-
tion was also a similar ﬁnding made by Shin, Cameron, and Cropp (2002). In
their survey of 800 practitioners, they found the dominating factors inﬂuen-
cing public relations activities and by extension, the enactment of organizational
stance, to be the dominant coalition’s support and understanding of public 
relations and the dominant coalition’s involvement with its external publics. In a
further study, Shin, Cameron, and Cropp (2006) argued that in the midst of the
constant call for public relations to be given a seat “at the table,” public relations
practitioners should ensure that they were “qualiﬁed and empowered to practice
autonomously” (p. 286).
The theme of the need for public relations practitioners to be represented in
the dominant coalition and to be involved in the frontlines of conﬂict manage-
ment was further emphasized in the study by Reber, Cropp, and Cameron (2003)
in which the authors described the tension of a hostile takeover for Conrail, Inc.
by Norfolk Southern Corporation. While legal practitioners’ involvement in high
proﬁle crisis was a given, the study found that the dynamism of a conﬂict neces-
sitated conﬂicts to be fought not just on the legal front but the public relations
front as well. Where regulatory, legal, and jurisdictional constraints forbade 
dialogue and negotiations to move to a higher level, public persuasion through
the utilization of strategic communication initiatives and ingenuity went a long
way to assuage hostile opinion. When legal and public relations worked together,
as did the practitioners at Norfolk Southern, much could be achieved. Where 
legal involvement was restricted, the authors argued that public relations could
be viewed as a “constructive creator of antecedent conditions for alternative 
dispute resolution” (p. 19).
Insight 3: If management of publics is paramount, organizations and 
practitioners would want to take cognizance of the threat involved in the 
crisis, and the make-up and inﬂuence of the publics, even as they seek to 
understand the interplay of factors at work before and as they embark on 
crisis communication.
Crisis Lesson Point: Understanding the make-up of the organization, incorpor-
ating and institutionalizing the involvement of public relations practitioners,
and recognizing the dominance of the top management collectively play key
roles in deciding how the organization should evaluate the importance of
publics. Top management may possess organizational dominance, but public
relations practitioners possess greater expertise to advise the top management
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on the value of stakeholder relationships. Set against the organizational back-
drop, they are often to agree on a level of comfort in addressing stakeholder
concerns.
New factors and new tests
With studies showing evidence of the theoretical rigor and validity of the con-
tingency theory’s grouping of the factors into existing themes (Reber & Cameron
2003; Shin et al. 2002, 2006), subsequent studies progressed to examine how
the theory could be used to address issues of international conﬂict and public 
relations practice across cultures. In the ﬁrst test of the contingency theory in 
the management of an international conﬂict, Zhang, Qui, and Cameron (2004)
examined how the United States and China resolved the crisis over the collision
of a US Navy reconnaissance plane with a Chinese ﬁghter jet in the South China
Sea in April 2001. The authors found further evidence that supported the dom-
inant coalition’s moral conviction as a key characteristic in precluding accommo-
dation and proscribing dialogue.
The theory was also applied extensively to examine public relations practice in
South Korea in various studies. In their survey, Shin et al. (2006) reinforced the
earlier ﬁndings of Shin et al. (2002) that organizational variables such as the involve-
ment of the dominant coalition played a dominant role in deﬁning public rela-
tions practice. This in turn constrained public relations activities, most notably,
in the release of negative information and in the handling of conﬂict situations.
Choi and Cameron (2005) sought to understand how multinational corpor-
ations (MNCs) practiced public relations in South Korea and what contingent 
factors impacted their stances in conﬂict situations. The authors identiﬁed a new
contingent variable that was added to the matrix when they found that most MNCs
tended to utilize accommodative stances based on fear. They feared the Korean
media’s negative framing of issues toward MNCs, which often caused them to
move from advocacy to accommodation. They feared the cultural heritage of Korean
people, a concept based on Cheong where clear distinctions were made between
those who were part of them and those who were not. “In Korean culture, We-ness
that tends to clearly distinguish our-side from not our-side, and Cheong is usually
given to our-side (e.g., Korean ﬁrms) seem to inﬂuence how Korean audiences
interpret MNCs’ messages and behaviors” (p. 186). Choi and Cameron (2005)
also uncovered another new contingent variable (Netizen) in their study of how
an entertainment company dealt with its promotion of public nudity in cell phones.
In all the studies, the contingency theory had been conceived to explain
interorganizational conﬂicts and practice between organizations and their diverse
publics. Pang, Cropp, and Cameron (2006) extended the theory further to
understand how it could be used to explain conﬂict and practice in an intra-
organizational setting. In their case study of a Fortune 500 organization, the authors
found that within an organization, the most important public, and by extension,
the greatest source of conﬂict for public relations practitioners, was the dominant
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coalition. A less enlightened dominant coalition, coupled with a conservative 
corporate culture, and the lack of access and representation of public relations in
the dominant coalition, were found to be factors that impeded the effectiveness
of practitioners.
Insight 4: If it is incumbent for organizations to manage and understand its
audience, as Seeger (2006) argued, then it is paramount for the crisis agenda
to assume management priority.
Crisis Lesson Point: The character and competence of dominant individuals in
the top management is one of the most important determinants and constants
in managing the unfolding events and in how the organization conducts 
its crisis communication campaigns. It does appear that leaders who are
involved, open to change, proactive, altruistic, supportive of public relations,
and been in frequent contact with publics are better placed to lead.
Stance Movements (2004–2007)
A best practice of crisis communication, then, is to acknowledge the uncertainty
inherent in the situation with statements such as, “The situation is ﬂuid,” and,
“We do not yet have all the facts.” This form of strategic ambiguity allows the
communicator to reﬁne the message as more information becomes available 
and avoid statements that are likely to be shown as inaccurate as more infor-
mation becomes available (Ulmer & Sellnow 2000).
(Seeger 2006: 241–2)
Crisis Challenge: Why do organizations and practitioners continue to adopt a
“no comment” position in crisis communication, thus appearing to stonewall,
when they can rely on other ﬁnessed options?
In terms of the driving force of stance movement, Pang, Jin, and Cameron (2004)
found that situational variables could play a signiﬁcant role in moving an advo-
cacy stance towards accommodation. Shin et al. (2005) argued that an organiza-
tion and its publics that are involved in a conﬂict often began with an advocacy
stance rather than accommodation.
Though the contingency theory had conceived stance movements as exclusively
advocacy, accommodation, or a point between advocacy and accommodation along
the continuum, subsequent studies have found dynamism in stance movements
where both advocacy and accommodation could be utilized and embedded one
in the other at the same time. In their study of how the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) was managed, for instance, Jin et al. (2006) found that though
the Singapore government adopted an advocacy stance towards its publics, it also
used accommodative stance to “ ‘sugar’, if you will, seemingly harsh medication
it was advocating” (p. 100). For instance, the authors found that while the Singapore
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government imposed strict regulations on the quarantine of infected patients and
caregivers, especially after it became known that more medical practitioners such
as nurses were becoming infected by their patients, it was also accommodative
and promptly instituted measures to provide ﬁnancial relief to ease the pain of
the policies it was imposing.
In their study of the intra-organizational tensions between public relations prac-
titioners and their dominant coalition, Pang et al. (2006) found that even though
an organization’s dominant coalition accommodated to the formulation of a regional
crisis plan, it began to assume a more advocating stance even as it appeared to
accommodate. The authors found that this was due to the conservative values,
production-driven, and patriarchal management style of the dominant coalition,
coupled with its apparent lack of support and understanding of communication
functions. The authors termed the simultaneous advocacy and accommodative stance
as “advocacy embedded in accommodation.” At the same time, the authors also
found a reverse phenomenon, what they termed “accommodation embedded in
advocacy.” This happened when acts of accommodation were displayed by line
managers towards the public relations practitioners even when the prevailing 
atmosphere instituted by the dominant coalition was one of advocacy.
Insight 5: In addressing ﬂuid situations, the organization is given the ﬂexibility
of assuming different stances to different publics during crisis at a given point
in time.
Crisis Lesson Point: Movement along the continuum is never meant to be static.
In some situations, it may mean having to accommodate, while in others,
to accommodate on one level and advocate on another, as long as the stances
assumed are not used, as Seeger (2006) argued, to “avoid disclosing uncom-
fortable information or closing off further communication” (p. 242), where
possible. On some issues, crisis communication may eventuate on an accom-
modative note, while on other non-negotiable issues like those cited in the 
proscriptive factors, it may permanently situate on the advocacy mode. Crisis
communication may not always be a “win-win” situation; neither must be it
a situation where one party wins and the other loses. It is a dynamic process
of dialogue and negotiation.
What Does It Mean for Crisis Communication?
Theory construction in public relations can be an arduous process, argued Broom
(2006). It typically begins with a concept “derived from practice and viewed by
practitioners as important” (p. 142). Certainly, a theory grounded in the prac-
titioners’ world often adds rich layers of context to understanding how theory 
and practice can integrate (Pang et al. 2006). Increasingly, Heath and Coombs
(2006) argued, accepted wisdom, “seats-of-the-pants thinking,” must be “guided
by theory” (p. 197).
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The ten best practices in crisis communication are: process approaches and 
policy development; pre-event planning; partnerships with public; listening to 
public’s concerns and understand the audience; honesty, candor, and openness;
collaborate and coordinate with credible sources; meet of the needs of the media
and remain accessible; communicate with compassion, concern, and empathy; accept
uncertainty and ambiguity; messages of self-efﬁcacy. This list was compiled in the
Journal of Applied Communication Research’s special issue on crisis communi-
cation in 2006, which is synthesized from the body of crisis communication 
scholarship by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD)
of the Department of Homeland Security, and may have provided some effective
principles. However, the ten best practices largely neglect the need to understand
the dynamics and complexity organizations face in crisis. The rigor and versatil-
ity of the contingency theory, thus, is argued to ﬁll the gap in what Fishman (1999)
bemoaned as existing approaches lacking in ability to “deal with a ‘crisis com-
munication situation’ i.e., multi-partied problems with varied levels of strategic
options and multi-dimensional harms” (p. 362).
How does the theory do that? The operative phrase: Strategic management. 
In discussing this, it would be useful to draw the relevance of the ﬁve insights
distilled.
First, reprogramming our thinking on how crisis communication can take
place, i.e., through the adoption of stances along a continuum instead of adher-
ing to a set model of communication (Insight 1), affords organizations strategic
options to engage in “out-of-the-box” thinking.
Second, the theory exhorts organizations to engage in strategic analyses before
and as they embark on crisis communication. Cognizance of the predisposing, 
situational, and proscriptive variables (Insight 2) would help organizations 
understand the complex realities they are working with in the crises.
Third, the theory calls for a strategic assessment of the nature of the publics
and the multi-dimensionality of external threats (Insight 3). This is extrapolated
against the interplay of factors internally to meet the external demands from the
crises and publics.
Fourth, while the criticality of the role of the dominant coalition in crises may
have been well documented (see Marra 1998; Pauchant & Mitroff 1992; Ray 1999),
this is reinforced by the ﬁndings of the theory. The character and competence 
of dominant individuals in the top management is one of the most important 
determinants and constants in managing the unfolding events and the way the
organization conducts its crisis communication campaigns (Insight 4), without which,
a crisis communication campaign would not have strategic impact among the
cacophony of competing voices in the chaotic marketplace.
Fifth, given the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in crises (Seeger 2006), 
organizations seek directions to help them negotiate through the mineﬁelds while
understanding the options open to them. Strategic adoption of stances along the
continuum affords organizations a framework to assess the motivations of their
positions, and grants them a preview of the likely outcomes of their actions.
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Building on foundational work across ten years since its inauguration, the 
contingency theory as a paradigm in the arena of strategic communication 
has been evolved, modiﬁed, tested, and improved consistently. Figure 26.1 is a
visual summary of these ideas. Public relations must emulate ﬁelds such as law,
engineering, and medicine to mature as a science and to gain further respect in
organizations.
Medical doctors do not insist that cancer conforms to a small handful of 
factors. For example, MDs take into account the type of tumor, the stage of 
disease, the patient’s age, gender, race, and health history (dozens of factors in
itself ), genetic factors, interaction effects of radiological, chemical, and surgical
interventions, and so forth. Embracing complexity has led to more powerful diag-
noses and treatment, ﬂying in the face of easy closure or “cubist” depictions of
social reality – the offering of facets of a complete image that must then be pieced
back together intuitively.
In assessing the relevance of a theory, perhaps Grunig’s (2006) insights could
not have been better argued:
I––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––I
Pure Advocacy Pure Accommodation
Stance Movement &
Stance Measurement
Original Matrix of Contingency Factors






Figure 26.1 The evolution of contingency theory of strategic conﬂict management
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We can judge a theory to be good, therefore, if it makes sense of reality (in the case
of a positive, or explanatory, theory) or if it helps to improve reality (in the case of
normative theory). Public relations scholars need to develop both positive and nor-
mative theories – to understand how public relations is practiced and to improve its
practice – for the organization, the publics, and for society. (p. 152)
The contingency theory has thus far offered a perspective supported by empirical
foundations. By Grunig’s (2006) deﬁnition, it is a positive theory. At the same
time, it does argue that while it has triggered a paradigmatic movement in pub-
lic relations thinking, having met Kuhn’s (1996) criteria that it has, ﬁrst, attracted
“an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientiﬁc 
activity,” and second, being “sufﬁciently open-ended to leave all sorts of prob-
lems for the redeﬁned group of practitioners to resolve” (p. 16), it does not posit
to be normative theory because it does not prescribe what ought to be. Yet the
work is cut out for contingency theorists to address the unanswered questions
that need to be resolved, reﬁned, and redeﬁned. We all hope to make the world
a better place, a little easier to understand. Broom (2006) could not have said 
it better: it is “our mission and our calling. Godspeed” (p. 149).
Appendix 1: Contingency Factors
Internal variables
Organization characteristics
• Open or closed culture
• Dispersed widely geographically or centralized
• Level of technology the organization uses to produce its product or service
• Homogeneity or heterogeneity of ofﬁcials involved
• Age of the organization/value placed on tradition
• Speed of growth in the knowledge level the organization uses
• Economic stability of the organization
• Existence or non-existence of issues management ofﬁcials or program
• Organization’s past experiences with the public
• Distribution of decision making power
• Formalization: number of roles or codes deﬁning and limiting the job
• Stratiﬁcation/hierarchy of positions
• Existence or inﬂuence of legal department
• Business exposure
• Corporate culture
Public relations department characteristics
• Number of practitioners total and number of college degrees
• Type of past training: trained in PR or ex-journalists, marketing, etc.
• Location of PR department in hierarchy: independent or under marketing umbrella/
experiencing encroachment of marketing/persuasive mentality
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• Representation in the dominant coalition
• Experience level of PR practitioners in dealing with crisis
• General communication competency of department
• Autonomy of department
• Physical placement of department in building (near CEO and other decision makers
or not)
• Staff trained in research methods
• Amount of funding available for dealing with external publics
• Amount of time allowed to use dealing with external publics
• Gender: percentage of female upper-level staff/managers
• Potential of department to practice various models of public relations
Characteristics of dominant coalition (top management)
• Political values: conservative or liberal/open or closed to change
• Management style: domineering or laid-back
• General altruism level
• Support and understanding of PR
• Frequency of external contact with publics
• Departmental perception of the organization’s external environment
• Calculation of potential rewards or losses using different strategies with external
publics
• Degree of line manager involvement in external affairs
Internal threats (how much is at stake in the situation)
• Economic loss or gain from implementing various stances
• Marring of employees’ or stockholders’ perceptions of the company
• Marring of the personal reputations of the company decision makers
Individual characteristics (public relations practitioners, domestic coalition, and line 
managers)
• Training in diplomacy, marketing, journalism, engineering, etc.
• Personal ethics
• Tolerance or ability to deal with uncertainty
• Comfort level with conﬂict or dissonance
• Comfort level with change
• Ability to recognize potential and existing problems
• Extent to openness to innovation
• Extent to which individual can grasp other’s worldview
• Personality: dogmatic, authoritarian
• Communication competency
• Cognitive complexity: ability to handle complex problems
• Predisposition toward negotiations
• Predisposition toward altruism
• How individuals receive, process, and use information and inﬂuence
• Familiarity with external public or its representative
• Like external public or its representative
• Gender: female versus male
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Relationship characteristics
• Level of trust between organization and external public
• Dependency of parties involved





• Potentially damaging publicity
• Scarring of company’s reputation in business community and in the general public
• Legitimizing activists’ claims
Industry environment
• Changing (dynamic) or static
• Number of competitors/level of competition
• Richness or leanness of resources in the environment
General political/social environment/external culture
• Degree of political support of business
• Degree of social support of business
The external public ( group, individual, etc.)
• Size and/or number of members
• Degree of source credibility/powerful members or connections
• Past successes or failures of groups to evoke change
• Amount of advocacy practiced by the organization
• Level of commitment/involvement of members
• Whether the group has public relations counselors or not
• Public’s perception of group: reasonable or radical
• Level of media coverage the public has received in past
• Whether representatives of the public know or like representatives of the organization
• Whether representatives of the organization know or like representatives from the 
public
• Public’s willingness to dilute its cause/request/claim
• Moves and countermoves
• Relative power of organization
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